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Yi Su* and Mihaela van der Schaar 
Abstract — In this paper, we consider the problem of resource allocation among two competing users sharing a 
binary symmetric broadcast channel. We model the interaction between autonomous selfish users in the resource 
allocation and analyze their strategic behavior in manipulating the allocation outcome. We analytically show that users 
will improve their performance (i.e. gain higher allocated rates) if they have more information about the strategy of the 
competing user. 
Index Terms — Broadcast Channel, Strategic Behavior 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Game theory has recently been applied to model and characterize the multi-user interaction in communication 
settings such as the information-theoretic multi-access channels [1], interference channels [2][3] and operational 
contention-based random access channels [4]. Issues such as fairness for multi-user interactions in allocating rates to 
users have been studied [1][2]. The existence and performance of equilibrium are studied for multi-user 
frequency-selective interference channels and ALOHA networks [3][4].  
As opposed to prior work, in which the main goal is mostly to examine the system performance of the wireless 
system in a game theoretic setting from a system planner perspective, in this letter we focus on studying the strategic 
behavior of the selfish users, i.e. their ability in manipulating the resource allocation outcome. We study this problem in 
a simple setting: the binary symmetric broadcast channels shared by two competing users. We model the interaction in 
the resource allocation among autonomous selfish users and analyze their behavior. We further consider the cases in 
which one user has different amounts of information about the strategy of other user. We show that this information 
benefits strategic users and results in an improved utility. While our results aim at quantifying the benefits of having 
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additional information about competing users in a simple two-user setting, they motivate the need for additional 
research in studying the multi-user strategic interaction in the wireless environment.  
II. THE TWO-USER INTERACTION FOR BINARY SYMMETRIC BROADCAST CHANNELS 
We consider a broadcast channel consisting of a pair of binary symmetric channels (BSC) with parameters (i.e. the 
cross-over probabilities) 1p  and 2p  (see pp. 568-570 [5]). Without loss of generality, we assume in this letter that 
1 20 0.5p p< < < . The capacity region for this channel is the convex hull of the closure of all ( )1 2,R R  satisfying  
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
2 21 ,
R H p H p
R H p
β
β
≤ ∗ −
≤ − ∗  (1) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )log 1 log 1H x x x x x= − − − − , ( ) ( )1 1p p pβ β β∗ = − + − , [ ]0, 0.5β ∈  [5]. It can be easily shown that the 
convex hull operation is not necessary. Therefore, the Pareto surface of the capacity region is given by 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
2 21 .
R H p H p
R H p
β
β
= ∗ −
= − ∗  (2) 
There are two users and a resource manager in the system and each user occupies a BSC. We denote by { }1,2N =  
the set of users. User i  holds the private information about its BSC parameter ip , which lies in the set [ ]0,0.5iΘ =  [5]. 
User i  announces the public information ip ′  about its ip . Note that for strategic users, ip ′  can differ from ip . For user 
i N∈ , the set of actions available for user i  to announce ip ′  is denoted Ai  and [ ]A 0,0.5i = . Let ( )1 2,p p′ ′ ′=p  and 
1 2A = A A× . Users have preferences over the outcomes of the resource allocation and these preferences are 
represented by a utility function, : Ai iu ×Θ → R , where iu  is the actual rate iR  that user i  can achieve in the 
allocation outcome. Fig. 1 shows the diagram of the resource allocation procedure. The resource manager calculates 
user i ’s achievable rate iR′  based on the public information ′p  and allocates the resources based on certain policy P  
that indicates the system goal. In this letter, we assume that the resource is divided based on the well-known 
proportional fair allocation [6], i.e. 1 2R R′ ′  is maximized, but other allocation rules could also be implemented and they 
will result in different strategic behavior. Summarizing, the tuple ( ) ( ) ( ), , A , ,i i iN uΘ P  defines the model of 
interaction between the users [7].  
The resource manager collects the public information ′p  and determines the optimal β  that maximizes 1 2R R′ ′ . 
Because the capacity region is convex, the optimal value uniquely exists. Taking the derivative with respect to β , we 
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have 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 22 1 1 1 2
1 2
1 11 1 2 log 1 2 log
R R p pH p p H p H p p
p p
β ββ ββ β β
′ ′∂ ′ ′− ∗ − ∗⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − ∗ − − ∗ − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦′ ′∂ ∗ ∗ . (3) 
The optimum optβ β=  satisfies { }1 2 10, 0 2
opt
R R
β β
ββ
=
′ ′∂
= ≤ ≤∂ . Note that optβ , iu , and iR  are functions of ′p . We will 
use optβ , iu , iR , ( )1 2,opt p pβ ′ ′ , ( )1 2,iu p p′ ′ , and ( )1 2,iR p p′ ′  interchangeably hereafter. After the manager determines optβ , 
users get their utilities. For example, if 1 2p p′ ′< , ( ) ( )1 1 1 1optu R H p H pβ= = ∗ −  and ( )2 2 21 optu R H pβ= = − ∗ . Note 
that in this letter we focus on the allocation outcome in the information theoretic sense, rather than operational issues. 
 
Fig. 1. System diagram. 
Existing work in the broadcast channel usually assumes that the resource allocation is performed based on the 
channel state information (CSI) fed back from the receivers. Since the system goal does not always coincide with the 
goals of the selfish users, the users have the incentives to strategically change their reported CSI, i.e. the announced 
public information ′p , to benefit themselves. Each selfish user plays strategically to maximize its own utility iu  by 
announcing appropriate public information Ai ip ′ ∈ , i.e. 
 
A
max
i i
i
p
R′∈
. (4) 
III. BEST RESPONSE IN THE TWO-USER INTERACTION 
In order to understand the behavior of individual users, here we first assume that user 1 reports 1p θ′ =  and user 2 
strategically reports 2p ′  instead of 2p . The resource manager will treat the cases in which 2p θ′ ≥  and 2p θ′ <  separately 
by transforming into different physically degraded channels [5]. To determine the optimal value of 2p ′  in (4), we 
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discuss two cases: 
•   First, if 2p θ′ ≥ , the rate user 2 can achieve is ( )2 21 optR H pβ= − ∗ . Therefore, the problem in (4) is identical to  
 ( )
2 2
2
A
min ,opt
p
pβ θ′∈ ′ . (5) 
•   Second, if 2p θ′ < , the rate user 2 can achieve now is ( ) ( )2 2 2optR H p H pβ= ∗ −  and problem (4) is identical to  
 ( )
2 2
2
A
max ,opt
p
pβ θ′∈ ′ . (6) 
Lemma 1: The best strategy for user 2 to maximize 2R  is to report its public information as 2 1p p θ′ ′= = . 
Proof: To show that 2 1p p θ′ ′= =  maximizes 2R , we need to demonstrate that 
2
0opt
p
β∂
>′∂  for both 2p θ′ <  and 
2p θ′ ≥ .  
First, we consider the case with 2p θ′ < . Denote ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
1 11 2 2 2
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β ββ ββ
β
′− ∗
′ ′∗ −′ ′ ′ ′∂ − ∗′ ′ = = − ⋅ ⋅ ′′ ′ ′′ − ∗∂ −− ∗
′∗
. 
The resource manager always chooses to operate at optβ β=  with 2 11 2 0
opt opt
R RR R
β β β ββ β= =
′ ′∂ ∂′ ′+ =∂ ∂ , i.e. 
( )1 2, , 1optg p p β′ ′ = − . In the following, we will show that ( )1 2
1
, ,
0
g p p
p
β′ ′∂
>′∂ ,
( )1 2
2
, ,
0
g p p
p
β′ ′∂
>′∂ , and
( )1 2, , 0g p p ββ
′ ′∂
<∂ . 
Because of these properties, if 2p ′  increases, optβ  needs to be increased in order to keep ( )1 2, , 1optg p p β′ ′ =− . Hence, we 
can conclude that
2
0opt
p
β∂
>′∂ .Using a similar argument, we can conclude that 1
0opt
p
β∂
>′∂ . 
To show
( )1 2
1
, ,
0
g p p
p
β′ ′∂
>′∂ ,
( )1 2
2
, ,
0
g p p
p
β′ ′∂
>′∂ , and
( )1 2, , 0g p p ββ
′ ′∂
<∂ , we have 
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, (7) 
in which 
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, and 23
1
1 2
1 2
pC
p
′−= − ′− . 
 Denote ( )
2
2 1
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11 2 log pD p
p
β
β
−
− ⎛ ⎞′− ∗ ⎟⎜′ ⎟= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟′∗⎝ ⎠ , ( )
2
2 21D H pβ −⎡ ⎤′= − ∗⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , and ( )( )
2
1
3 2
1
11 log pD H p
p
ββ β
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.  
Taking the derivative with respect to 1p ′ , we have 
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Clearly, 
( )1 2
1
, ,
0
g p p
p
β′ ′∂
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1 1 1
1 12 2 1 2 log 1 2 log
H p p pH p H p p p p p
p p p
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 Taking the derivative with respect to 2p ′ , we have 
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Taking the derivative with respect to β , we have 
 
( ) ( )( ){ ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2
3 3 2 1 1
21 1
2 1 2 1
1 2 12 2
1
2 1 1 1
1
, , 1 2 11 log
1
1 2 1 1 1
log log log
1
1 11 log 1 2 log
g p p p pC D H p H p H p
pp p
p p p p
p p pp p
pH p p H p H p
p
β ββ ββ ββ β
β β β
β β ββ β
β ββ ββ
⎡′ ′∂ ′ ′− − ∗⎢′ ′ ′= − ∗ ∗ − ⋅⎢ ′′ ′∂ ∗− ∗ ∗⎢⎣
⎤′− ′ ′ ′− ∗ − ∗ − ∗⎥− ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅⎥′ ′ ′′ ′ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ − ∗ ⎥⎦
⎡ ′− ∗ −⎢ ′ ′ ′ ′− ∗ − + ∗ −⎢ ′∗⎣
( )2 2
2
1 2 .p p
pβ
⎤′∗ ⎥′− ⎥′∗ ⎦
 (10) 
Let ( )
( )( )
1 2, 11 log
pf p pp p
p
β ββ β β
−= − ∗− ∗ ∗ ∗
. It is easy to show that ( ), 0f p
p
β∂
<∂ . Therefore, we have 
( ) ( )2 1, ,f p f pβ β′ ′> , which leads to ( )1 2
, ,
0
g p p β
β
′ ′∂
<∂ . 
Second, we consider the case in which 2p θ′ < . Using the fact that 
1
0opt
p
β∂
>′∂  for 2 1p p′ ′< , by symmetry, we can also 
conclude that 
2
0opt
p
β∂
>′∂  for 2 1p p′ ′≥ .  
Therefore, we have
2
0opt
p
β∂
>′∂  for both 2 1p p′ ′<  and 2 1p p′ ′≥ . The optimal solution of (4) is 2 1p p θ′ ′= = .    ■ 
We simulate an example in which 1 1 0.1p p ′= =  and 2 0.2p = . The result is shown in Fig. 2 and 3. We can see that 
optβ  monotonically increases in 2p ′  and the best strategy in maximizing 2R  is to let 2 1 0.1p p′ ′= = . 
In fact, given 1p θ′ = , considering the discontinuity of the allocated rate 2R  as a function of 2p ′  (see Fig. 3), user 2 
will always choose to announce that 2p θ ε′ = + , where 0ε >  and 0ε → . Similarly, given 2p ξ′ = , user 1 will always 
choose to announce that 1p ξ ε′ = − . Therefore, for 1p θ′ =  and 2p θ ε′ = + , where 0ε >  and 0ε → , nobody will 
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deviate from this point because no user can gain more utility by unilaterally changing its action Ai ip ′ ∈ . Hence, based 
on the definition of the Nash equilibrium [7], we can conclude that the considered interaction between the users reaches 
Nash equilibrium. 
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Fig. 2. optβ for different announced 2p ′ . 
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Fig. 3. Actual allocated rate 2R  for different announced 2p ′ . 
For an intuitive explanation about the result, we resort to the basic idea of the superposition coding for the degraded 
broadcast channel (Theorem 15.6.2, pp.565-567, [5]). An auxiliary random variable will serve as a cloud center 
distinguishable by both receivers. Each cloud consists of 12nR codewords. The worst receiver can only see the clouds, 
while the better receiver can see the individual codewords within the clouds. The worse receiver will always want to 
decrease the size of the clouds, since it can only distinguish the clouds and decreasing the size of clouds will increase 
his achievable rate. On the contrary, the better receiver will always want to increase the distance between the centers of 
the clouds so that he can accommodate more bits in each cloud. In other words, the better receiver wants to increase the 
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size of clouds. Specifically, in our problem, β  is the variable indicating the size of the clouds. Recall that 0β =  when 
1 0R = (i.e. cloud size is zero) and 0.5β =  when 2 0R = (i.e. cloud is large and overlapped such that user 2 gets 
nothing). In short, the worse receiver wants a small β  but the better receiver prefers a largeβ . In Lemma 1, we have 
already shown that 
2
0opt
p
β∂
>′∂ . By “moderately bragging”, a worse receiver can decrease the size of the clouds and 
increases his rate. However, if he excessively brags, he will become “the better receiver” conceptually and he needs to 
decode within each cloud so that shrinking the cloud size does no benefit him. The discontinuity comes from the fact 
that if 2p ′  goes across 1p , the roles of the better receiver and the worse receiver switch, which causes the achievable 
rates of these two different coding schemes not to be continuous at the boundary of 2 1p p′ =  unless 2 1p p= . 
IV. IMPACT OF SIDE INFORMATION 
In this section, based on the results of the previous section, we briefly discuss the impacts of the side information 
about the other user’s strategy. We will show that a user having additional information about the strategy of the other 
user will increase its utility. In practice, it is usually difficult for users to accurately access the complete information 
about the other user’s strategy, but it is possible to have some side information about them. This kind of side 
information could be obtained by repeatedly participating in the resource allocation and observing the multi-user 
interaction. We assume that the public information 1p ′  that user 1 announces is a random variable Y  with the 
probability density function (pdf) ( )1p y′ , [ ]0, 0.5y ∈ . User 2 has side information Z  relevant to 1p ′  with pdf 
( ) ( ), ,p z z ∈ −∞ +∞ . Assume Y and Z have joint pdf ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, |p y z p z p y z′ ′= , [ ]0, 0.5y ∈ , ( ),z ∈ −∞ +∞ . User 2 
determines its response 2p z′  such that its utility, the expectation of its allocated rate ( ) [ ]1 2,p y zE R , is maximized: 
 ( ) [ ]1
2 2
2,
A
max p y z
p z
E R′ ∈
. (11) 
( ) [ ]1 2,p y zE R  can be expressed as 
 ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
0.5 0.5
2 1 2 2 1 2 2,
0 0
, , | | , |p y zE R p y z R y p z dydz p z p y z R y p z dy dz
+∞ +∞
−∞ −∞
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜′ ′ ′ ′= = ⋅ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ , (12) 
where ( )2 2, |R y p z′  represents the rate allocated to user 2 with public information y and 2 |p z′ . 
Therefore, this expectation-maximization strategy is equivalent to 
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 ( ) ( )
2 2
0.5
1 2 2
| A
0
max | , |
p z
p y z R y p z dy′ ∈
′ ′∫ . (13) 
Now we consider three types of ( )1 |p y z′  with different amounts of side information and examine the corresponding 
impacts. In the first case, suppose there exists an injective function [ ] ( ): 0, 0.5 ,f → −∞ +∞  and ( )z f y= . Hence, Z  
provides all the information about Y  and ( ) ( )( )11 |p y z y f zδ −′ = − . Second, we consider the general ( )1 |p y z′  as an 
intermediate case, in which no injective function mapping Y  to Z  exists and ( ) ( )1 1|p y z p y′ ′≠ . In the third case, Z  is 
independent of Y , i.e.Z  provides no information about Y and ( ) ( )1 1|p y z p y′ ′= . The best response and corresponding 
expected utility 2iR  that user 2 can achieve in the i th case is different. In the following, we will investigate these 
different cases in detail. 
In the first case, given the side information z , from Lemma 1, the best strategy is to announce ( )12p f z−′ = . Thus, 
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′ ∈−∞
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−
′ ∈−∞
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ′ ′= ⋅ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ′= ⋅ − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
′=
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫
 (14) 
In the second case, 22R  is given in (12) for the general ( )1 |p y z′ . 
In the third case, we have ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1, |p y z p z p y z p z p y′ ′ ′= = , and therefore 
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+∞
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+∞
′ ∈−∞
′∈
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ′ ′= ⋅ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ′ ′= ⋅ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
′ ′=
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫
 (15) 
The second equality holds because the maximizer of 2 |p z′  is independent of z . 
Denote ( ) ( )
2 2
0.5
*
2 1 2 2
| A
0
| arg max | , |
p z
p z p y z R y p z dy′ ∈
′ ′ ′= ∫  and ( ) ( )
2 2
0.5
*
2 1 2 2
A
0
arg max ,
p
p p y R y p dy′∈
′ ′ ′= ∫ . By Lemma 1, we know 
that ( ) ( )2 2 2 2, , ,R y y R y p p y′ ′> ∀ ≠ . Therefore, in the second case, ( ) ( ) ( )* *2 2 2 2, , | , , | ,z p z y R y p z R y y⎡ ⎤′ ′∃ ∈ −∞ +∞ ≠ <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
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otherwise we can construct an injective function that maps Y  to Z . Consequently, we have 
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 (16) 
By setting * *2 2|p z p′ ′= , we can show another inequality 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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0.5
2
2 1 2 2
| A
0
0.5
*
1 2 2
0
0.5
* 3
1 2 2 2
0
max | , |
| ,
, .
p z
R p z p y z R y p z dy dz
p z p y z R y p dy dz
p y R y p dy R
+∞
′ ∈−∞
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⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ′ ′> ⋅ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
′ ′= =
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫
 (17) 
The inequality in (17) strictly holds, because in the second case ( ) ( )1 1|p y z p y′ ′≠ , ( ) * *2 2, , |z p z p⎡ ⎤′ ′∃ ∈ −∞ +∞ ≠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , 
and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0.5 0.5
* *
1 2 2 1 2 2
0 0
| , | | ,p y z R y p z dy p y z R y p dy′ ′ ′ ′>∫ ∫ . 
Combining the two inequalities, we have  
 1 2 32 2 2R R R> > . (18) 
From (18), we can conclude that more side information about the strategy of the others will help the strategic users 
improve their performance. Therefore, strategic users in the resource allocation have the incentive to obtain as much 
side information about the strategy of other users as possible. To quantify the amount of this side information, we can 
define it based on the achieved utility: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
0.5
* *
1 2 2 2 2
0
0.5
* *
1 2 2 2 2
0
; | , | ,
| , | ,
UI Y Z p z p y z u y p z u y p dydz
p z p y z R y p z R y p dydz
+∞
−∞
+∞
−∞
⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤′ ′ ′= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
. (19) 
Note that ( ) ( )
2 2
0.5
*
2 1 2 2
| A
0
| arg max | , |
p z
p z p y z R y p z dy′ ∈
′ ′ ′= ∫ , which is a function of  ( )1 |p y z′ .Therefore, ( )*2 2, |u y p z⎡ ⎤′⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  is a 
function of ( )1 |p y z′ . Similarly, because ( ) ( )
2 2
0.5
*
2 1 2 2
A
0
arg max ,
p
p p y R y p dy′∈
′ ′ ′= ∫ , ( )*2 2,u y p ′ is a function of ( )1p y′ . We can 
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see that ( );UI Y Z coincides with the well-known mutual information ( );I Y Z  [5] if the utility functions take the form 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
*
2 2 1
*
2 2 1
, | log |
, log
u y p z p y z
u y p p y
⎡ ⎤′ ′=⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
′ ′=
. (20) 
In other words, the mutual information ( );I Y Z  is a special case of this utility-based information measure ( );UI Y Z . 
Strategic users always try to obtain as much amount of ( );UI Y Z  as possible in order to benefit themselves. In practice, 
this side information could be attained if the users are equipped with advanced radios, such as cognitive radios, with the 
abilities to sense, infer, and learn the environment. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this letter, we study the strategic behavior by presenting an example of a two-user binary symmetric broadcast 
channel. We examine the interactions between autonomous selfish users in the resource allocation and analyze their 
strategic behaviors. We also explicitly show that users will improve their performance if they have additional 
information about the strategy of other users. Hence, although in this work we only consider a simple two-user binary 
symmetric broadcast channel and assume the rule of proportional fairness, our results show that determining how to 
attain this additional information in a multi-user strategic interaction setting deserves investigation in future research. 
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